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JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann., Sec. 78-2a-3(2)(i).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Issue on Appeal. The issues presented to the Court for review are (1)
whether the trial Court abused its discretion in awarding petitioner alimony in excess
of her needs, (2) in failing to divide the retirement assets equally, and (3) in ordering
respondent to pay petitioner's attorney's fees.
Standard of Review. Awards of spousal support are reviewed for abuse
of discretion. Paffel v. PaffeL 732 P.2d 96, 100 (Utah 1986). The same standard is
applicable to the trial court's division of property. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d
820, 823 (Utah App. 1989). The standard of review of the reasonableness of an award
of attorney's fees is "patent error or clear abuse of discretion." Valcare v. Fitzgerald,
961 P.2d305, 316 (Utah 1998).

STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
A.
Section 30-3-5(1), Utah Code Ann.: "When a decree of
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating
to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties."
B.

Section 30-3-5(7), Utah Code Ann.:

(a)
The Court shall consider at least the following
factors in determining alimony:
(i)
the financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse...

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The parties were married on September 4, 1964. They had five children,
all of whom were emancipated prior to the parties' separation. At the time of trial,
petitioner ("Jeanny") was employed by the Bureau of Land Management. She earned
$2,274 per month. Respondent ("Johnny") was employed as a cabinet maker. He
earned $4,507 per month.
Following bifurcation, the parties stipulated to a partial division of real
and personal property, leaving five issues unresolved for trial:
a.

Jeanny's request for an eight acre parcel of the farm

property awarded to Johnny;
b.

the division of retirement assets;

c.

the disposition of a bank account with approximately

$10,000 on deposit;
d.

Jeanny's request for alimony; and

e.

attorney's fees.

Except for the retirement assets, the Court divided the real and personal
property in a manner that favored Jeanny, and then attempted to equalize this

discrepancy by giving Johnny $33,400 in "credits" against his alimony obligation,
which the Court ordered Johnny to pay at the rate of $1,000 per month for ten years.
Addressing the retirement assets separately, the Court awarded each party
his or her retirement accounts. This left Johnny with his 401(k) account valued at
$6,731. Jeanny received her Thrift Savings Account, which was valued at $51,385,
her pension with an anticipated value of $150 per month.1 This division gave Jeanny
88% of the retirement assets that existed at the time of trial, plus her pension.
The Court then ordered Johnny to pay $2,500 of Jeanny's attorney's fees.

ARGUMENT
1.
The Court abused its discretion in awarding Jeanny alimony in
excess of her needs.
The Court has broad discretion in making an alimony award, but it must
exercise that discretion within appropriate legal standards. In Bell v. BelL 810 P.2d
489 (Utah App. 1991), the Utah Court of Appeals held that it is an abuse of discretion
for a court not to consider each of three factors set forth in Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d
1072 (Utah 1985) in determining a spouse's need for alimony. Those factors are (1)
the receiving spouse's reasonable and necessary needs, (2) the receiving spouse's
ability to support him- or herself, and (3) the paying spouse's ability to make up the
\ Both parties had also liquidated retirement assets postseparation. Johnny cashed in an annuity
worth $5,766. Jeanny liquidated a joint IDS account worth $17,501. No consideration was given to
any of the funds that had been spent.

shortfall, if any. In considering these factors, the trial court is required to make
adequate factual findings on all material issues unless the facts in the record are "clear,
uncontroverted, and capable of supporting only a finding in favor of the judgment."
Haumont v. Haumont 793 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Throckmorton v.
Throckmorton, 767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App. 1988)).
Here the Court made no findings regarding the Jones factors. Rather, it
simply stated that "alimony of $1,000 per month is appropriate." This arbitrary figure
was inconsistent with the evidence presented at trial, which established that Jeanny's
unmet needs were no more than $178 per month.
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Jeanny, her needs were
$1,775 per month. This was set forth in her Financial Declaration, which was
"received as a pleading" (Tr. 29). In it, she claimed to need $2,210 per month, but she
admitted that this figure included the $335 payment on the farm property that was
awarded to Johnny (Tr. 70). Ignoring all of the challenges Johnny made to the rest of
Jeanny's claims, her monthly needs were therefore no more than $1,775.
Jeanny's income was established by her wage stub (Exh. 5). It showed
that she netted $632.08 every two weeks, or $1,369.51 per month. In addition to this
figure, however, Jeanny was making voluntary contributions to her Thrift Savings Plan
of $104.96 every two weeks, or $227.41 per month (Tr. 58 and 71). Adding this to
her net income, she had $1,596.92 available to meet her monthly needs.

Subtracting Jeanny's income of $1,596.92 from her budget of $1,775.00,
she would be left with unmet needs of $178.08. This is the maximum amount of
alimony that could have been awarded based on the evidence presented to the Court.
For the purposes of this appeal, Johnny's ability to pay is conceded.

2.
assets equally.

The Court abused its discretion in failing to divide the retirement

Absent special circumstances, property accumulated by the parties during
the marriage should be equally divided. Maxwell v. Maxwell 754 P.2d 84, 86-87
(Utah App. 1990). The court ignored this principle, apparently deciding to give Jeanny
virtually all of the retirement assets because she had earned them: "She's put that
money in her retirement. To divide that equitably, I'm going to give it to her ...
perhaps he ought to get some credit for that, but I'm just not going to give him any."
Tr. 129-30.
Johnny was an equal partner in this marriage; the distribution of marital
assets, including retirement assets, should reflect that fact. The trial court's division of
retirement assets, in which Jeanny received 88% of the total, was an abuse of
discretion.

3.
The Court abused its discretion by ordering Johnny to pay $2,500
of Jeanny's attorney's fees.
The decision to award attorney's fees must be based on evidence of the
reasonableness of the requested fees, the financial need of the receiving spouse, and the
ability of the other spouse to pay. Bell v. Bell 810 P.2d 489, 493 (Utah App. 1991).
Here the court ordered Johnny to pay $2,500 of Jeanny's fees without
addressing any of these factors. Jeanny testified that she had paid $3,000 in fees (Tr.
44). During closing arguments, her counsel indicated that this figure was actually
$2,500, and this was the total amount that had been billed (Tr. 113-14).
There was no evidence of Jeanny's need. To the contrary, the evidence
was that Jeanny had virtually all of the marital funds in her possession, and no need
for assistance from Johnny.
Jeanny testified that since the parties' separation, she had sold Johnny's
boat and swather for $26,000 (Tr. 53). Half of this money was unaccounted for. The
other half was placed "in escrow" for Johnny (Tr. 52). By the time of trial, however,
Jeanny had changed her mind and decided to keep it all for herself (Tr. 52-53). In
addition to this, she withdrew $11,000 and $6,501 from a joint mutual fund account in
November 1998 (Tr. 55) by forging Johnny's name to the checks (Tr. 56, Exh. 10).
Jeanny was allowed to keep all of this money. In the absence of
established need, it was error for the court to order Johnny to pay any of Jeanny's fees.

CONCLUSION
Johnny requests that this matter be remanded Willi speciik instruction^ to
th ::: ti ial coi ir t to si itei findings ^ vhicl 1 ai e consistei it "\ < - itl 1 tl le e\ idence

Jeani i> ' s

entitlement to alimony is no more than $178 per month. Johnny is entitled to one-half
of the retirement assets, including the pension. Finally, because there was no evidence
of i leed on Jeanny ""s pai t, si i

;.

DATED Lliib _j_^_

:

.

iieiit to attoi ney 's fees.

lav nf Mav 2001.

^f\
JAMESH^WOODALL
Attorney fo^ appellant

J

_

ADDENDUM
1.

Decree of Divorce dated February 22, 2001.

2.

F -vliii-..- •:

j.

Transcript of Court's IUIIML

'nJusions of Law uuicci i ebruary 22, 2001
••

:
:

s

•' «:

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I certify that I caused two copies of the foregoing BRIE
APPELLANT +~ be delivered

..- : . .•...;„ •>

Rosemond (J. Blakelock
?<>5 East 300 South
Pro\o. Utah 84606

•

r^-2001:

JAMES H. VVOODALL (5361)
I..1TTLEFIELD & PETERSON
Attorneys lor respondent
426 South 500 East
Salt Lake Cily, Utah 84102
Telephone: (801) 531-0435

&p<y

IN I HE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT C O U R T
O l M M \II < O H M \ , U I \I1

JEANNY 1 ,OUISE DAVIS,,

r

'NDINGS OF FACT AND
NCTIJSTONS OF I A W

Petiti 3nei
vs.
Case No. 98-4800202 DA
JOHlNM IMA< I\ DA \ IS,
iudee folin R. Ajiderson
Respondent.

T' • in.iivr came on for trial on July (>, 2000 before the 1lonorable John R.
Anderson. Petitioner ("Jeanny") was prescn! and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock.
Respoi ident (" lol n n iy")

>as pi esei it ai id i epi esented by lai i les 1 1 W oodall

I he Coi n t I las

previously bifurcated this matter, having entered a decree oi divorce.
The parties advised the < out! ih u ik
included the lol lowing lernis:

Li*' n a> I M •< i i |MMII II

ipuLu n n i

In

Real Property
1.

Jeanny shall be awarded as her sole and exclusive property the residence

located at 3067 South 500 West, Vernal. Utah, including approximately 3 acres of land. This
property is unencumbered by debt, and is valued at SI74,000.
2.

Johnny shall be awarded as his sole and exclusive property the farm

located at 2900 South 500 West, Vernal, Utah, which consists of approximately 46.57 acres,
subject to Jeanny's request for an eight acre parcel of this property. This property is valued
at $134,000. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, the farm is to be sold, with all
proceeds awarded to Johnny.
Personal Property
3.

Johnny shall be awarded as his sole and exclusive property the

following:

a.

The bale wagon, valued at $3,000

b
c.

The hay baler, valued at $4,000
The Case 1070 tractor, including the disc, plows, and brush hog.
These items are owned by Johnny's parents, and no value is
assigned to them.
The horse trailer, valued at $1,000
The utility trailer, valued at $1,000
All power and hand tools, and all woodworking equipment in the
shop at the residence, valued at $5,000.
The parties" four horses, saddles, and tack
The grand piano
.50 caliber muzzleloading rifle, valued al $175
Winchester .22 lever action rifle, valued at $225
Winchester .32 lexer action rifle, valued at S200
Marlin 12 gauge shotgun, \allied at SI 50
Smith & Wesson 7mm magnum rifle, valued at S500
Craiu 30-40 rifle, valued at SI25

d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.

o.
p.
q.
r.
4.

Smitli & Wesson .357 magnum pistol, valued at S300
The leasehold miercsi in the 2000 CMC pickup truck
The 1958 Chevrolet Impala automobile, valued at $4,500
The 1985 Ponliac Ficro automobile, valued at $3,232.50

Jeanny shall be awarded as her sole and. exclusive propcil

llu

following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
5. ,

The tiller, weed eater, and two mowers, valued at S500
Household furniture, valued at $5,000
The large freezer, valued at $200
The small freezer, valued at S200
The upright piano, valued at $1,000
The 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck, valued at V. Li.*"-.^.-.

; IK: i jurt -p;.*;* '-''- !; '

. '•'-

'-

'

M:

-Arties advised the

C ourt that the following items remained in dispute:
a.
b
c...

on deposit;
d.
e

Jeanny's request for an eight acie JM:
The division of retirement assets;
*- disposition of a bank account with approximately SI 0.000
•

i

-.-anny's request for alimony; and
--;ann\ 's request foi" iH^ K-\ ' fee

The ("oiirt, having heard the teslimon\ oi the parlies, and having considered the
evidence presented, makes the following Findings of Fact:
6.

T •

•

>riion of the farm is denied.

7.

The Coin"! unds thai die \alue of the real and personal property awarded

to Jeanny is 5192,000,., and the re*n mil pi i .onal pi>»j n- IW.II ded to Johnny is $165,000.
The difference is S27.000, which shall be characterized as a credit to Johnnv.

8.

Jeanny may retain the S 6 J 0 0 that remains on deposit in the American

Express IDS account, but Johnny shall be awarded that amount as an additional credit, plus
S300 for the appraisal fees.
9.

The Court believes that alimony of S 1,000 per month is appropriate,

beginning with the month of July 2000 and continuing until the first of the parties attains the
age of sixty-five years. As of the date of trial, both parties are fifty-five years old, making
this a ten year alimony award. Johnny shall have the option of paying this in a lump-sum,
discounted to present value at the Federal Funds rate of 6.54%, or paying it monthly. Johnny
shall have until July 6, 2001 to make this election. In any event, Johnny is entitled to credits
of $33,400, which shall be characterized as prepaid alimony.
10.

Each party shall retain the retirement and pension accounts in his or her

name. Specifically, Johnny shall be awarded his 401 (k) account at Utah Retirement Systems,
valued at $6,730.95, the Horace Mann annuity, valued at $5,765.80, and his Utah Retirement
Systems pension. Jeanny shall be awarded her Federal Retirement Thrift Savings account,
valued at $51,385.40. the American Express IDS account, subject to Johnny's credit as set
forth above, and her Federal Retirement Systems pension. Equitably, perhaps Johnny ought to
get a portion ofJeanny's retirement assets, but the Court declines to give him any of it based
on the Court's finding that Johnny is trained in many trades and capable of working, where
Jeanny. after thirty-five years of marriage, is at a point in her life where she needs that
retirement for her security.

V! •eraaiLihi:1 Series lil; Savings Bonds shall be divided equally. 11K
in identifying these b« >nds and dividing

parlies ^

them equally, to include requesting an ilemi/ed list of bonds issued in the names of both
pai ties fi oi n the I reasi try Department.
12.

Johnny is ordered to pay Jeanny $2,500 for th .iiionu*."- f<-<

incurred m this matter.
DATED this

/p

2001.

TOHN R. ANDERSON
DISTRICT COl !RT JUDGE

-*«:• i <s

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 certify that 1 mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS OF
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to the following on January 29, 2001:
Rosemond G. Blakelock
305 East 300 South
Provo, Utah 84606
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[}HW*\f
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH
***

H*

*T*

"f*

*f*

t*

JEANNY LOUISE DAVIS,
DECREE OF DIVORCE
FOLLOWING BIFURCATION

Petitioner,
vs.

Case No. 98-4800202 DA
JOHNNY MACK DAVIS,
Jud^e John R. Anderson
Respondent.
)

This matter came on for trial on July 6, 2000 before the Honorable John R.
Anderson. Petitioner ("Jeanny") was present and represented by Rosemond G. Blakelock.
Respondent ("Johnny") was present and represented by James H. Woodall. The Court has
previously bifurcated this matter, and the Court having previously entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, the Court enters the following DECREE OF DIVORCE:
1.

Jcanny is awarded as her sole and exclusive property the residence

located at 3007 South 500 West. Vernal. Utah, including approximately 3 acres of land. This
property is unencumbered by debt, and is valued at SI74,000.

2.

Johnny is awarded as his sole and exclusive property the farm located at

2900 Souih 500 West, VernaL Utah, which consists of approximately 46.57 acres. This
properly is valued at $134,000. The farm is to be sold, with all proceeds awarded to Johnny.
3.

Johnny is awarded as his sole and exclusive property the following:
a.

The bale wagon, valued at $3,000

b
c.

The hay baler, valued at $4,000
The Case 1070 tractor, including the disc, plows, and brush hog.
These items are owned by Johnny's parents, and no value is
assigned to them.
The horse trailer, valued at $1,000
The utility trailer, valued at $1,000
All power and hand tools, and all woodworking equipment in the
shop at the residence, valued at $5,000.
The parties' four horses, saddles, and tack
The grand piano
.50 caliber muzzleloading rifle, valued at SI75
Winchester .22 lever action rifle, valued at $225
Winchester .32 lever action rifle, valued at $200
Marlin 12 gauge shotgun, valued at $150
Smith & Wesson 7mm magnum rifle, valued at S500
Craig 30-40 rifle, valued at $125
Smith & Wesson .357 magnum pistol, valued at S300
The leasehold interest in the 2000 CMC pickup truck
The 1958 Chevrolet Impala automobile, valued at $4,500
The 1985 Pontiac Fiero automobile, valued at $3,232.50

d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.
j.
k.
1.
m.
n.
o.
p.
q.
r.
4.

Jeanny is awarded as her sole and exclusive property the

following:
a.
b.
c.
d.
c.
f.

The tiller, weed eater, and two mowers, valued at $500
Household furniture, valued at 55,000
The large freezer, valued at S200
The small freezer, valued at S200
The upright piano, valued at S 1,000
The 1995 Chevrolet pickup truck, valued at SI 1.132.50.

5.

Johnny is awarded a credit of 527,000. representing the difference

between the value of the real and personal property he has been awarded, and the value of the
real and personal property Jcanny has been awarded. Jeanny may retain the S6,l00 that
remains on deposit in the American Express IDS account, but Johnny shall be awarded that
amount as a additional credit, plus $300 for the appraisal fees.
6.

Johnny is ordered to pay Jeanny $1,000 per month as alimony,

beginning with the month of July 2000 and continuing until the first of the parties attains the
age of sixty-five years. As of the date of trial, both parties are fifty-five years old, making
this a ten year alimony award. Johnny shall have the option of paying this in a lump-sum,
discounted to present value at the Federal Funds rate of 6.54%, or paying it monthly. Johnny
shall have until July 6, 2001 to make this election. In any event, Johnny is entitled to credits
of $33,400. which shall be characterized as prepaid alimony.
7.

Each party shall retain the retirement and pension accounts in his or her

name. Specifically, Johnny shall be awarded his 401(k) account at Utah Retirement Systems,
valued at $6,730.95, the Horace Mann annuity, valued at $5,765.80, and his Utah Retirement
Systems pension. Jeanny shall be awarded her Federal Retirement Thrift Savings account,
valued at S51,385.40, the American Express IDS account, subject to Johnny's credit as set
forth above, and her Federal Retirement Systems pension.
8.

All remaining Series EI.: Savings Bonds shall be divided equally. The

parties are ordered to cooperate with each other in identifying these bonds and dividing them

equally, to include requesting an itemized list of bonds issued in the names of both parties
from the Treasury Department.
9.

Johnny is ordered to pay Jeanny S2.500 for the attorney's fees she has

incurred in this matter.
DATED this (if

day of

DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

5

THE COURT:

I appreciate the way this case has

6

been handled, counsel, and I appreciate your

7

professionalism on this.

8
9

Substantively, what I'm going to do is dissolve
or—dissolve the marriage or award the property by

10

determining that alimony is appropriate, but somehow ,

11

calculate the future worth of the difference in

12

incomes, based on a present award, and somehow factor

13

that into the difference of the division of the marital

14

assets.

15

It seems to the Court that a 35-year marriage, and

16

with the abilities shown here by the 'Respondent that he

17

has many trades, he has had a successful career with

18

Chevron and with Costal.

19

running a swather for--in the summer months.

20

many trades.

21

that appeals to him and probably something that he will

22

continue to do.

23

do and probably, at his age, that's what he'll continue

24

to do.

25

more income—that's subjective, though, and there's no

He's also pretty adept at
He's got

The woodworking is probably something

My estimate is that's what he likes to

I think that, if he wanted to, he could make

12 6
1

real evidence in the record to support that.

2

A 35-year marriage, I think that the standard of

3

living and the difference in income justifies an

4

alimony award in this case.

5

of testimony in terms of the cash that was given over,

6

but absent receipts or canceled checks, or so forth, I

7

can only believe the side that's telling me it didn't

8

happen.

9

estranged husband is going to be paying cash to a

There's been a divergence

If, during the course of a divorce, an

10

spouse, his attorney should have advised him, or he'd.

11

better have enough common sense to put it in the form

12

of a check or a receipt.

13

of cash, she says he may or may not h a v e — o r he didn't,

14

flat out-

15

of the evidence on that one.

16

He says he paid her a bunch

I'm going to give the Petitioner the benefit

I think that attorney's fees award are

17

appropriate.

I think the fee is entirely reasonable,

18

given the situation.

19

lot more ability to earn income and to choose the way

20

he'll earn the income than does the Petitioner.

21

Petitioner's stuck in her BLM job.

22

evidence about her educational background or other

23

skills, but it's my belief, based on the evidence, that

24

that's probably what she's going to do the rest of her

25

life.

I think that the Respondent has a

The

I didn't hear any

127
ill

What I'm going to do, though, is--and I'll allow

2 || counsel to invite me to rule on issues I haven't
3 || covered--I've given you the substance of what I want to
4 || do.

I think she's entitled to at least $1,000 a month

5

alimony.

6

go to your actuarial tables.

7

record the ages of the parties, but I think that

8

alimony should continue until one of the parties is

9

able to retire at the age of 62 or 65—probably 65, in

10

his case.

And based on that figure, I want counsel to
I didn't hear in the

Give me the present value of that kind of..

11 money, payable now.

Work that into the difference on

12

the marital asset equation of about — and I'll find the

13

difference is $192, as compared to $165.

14

will have to come from the—if--I guess there's a tax

15 I benefit to awarding it that way.

That figure

There's some

16

advantage to the Petitioner in getting a lump sum,

17

that's what she's asked for.

18

the first year or two, or two and a half years, at

19

least, of the difference in marital assets.

20

figure, I guess, needs to be paid.

21

credit for the $6,100 cash that remains in the bank

22

account.

23

appraisal fee.

24

without knowing the ages of the parties, I have no

25

realm of what that number would be, and I'll either

She'll have a credit of

That other

I'll give him a

I'll give him a credit for half of the
And I guess, off the top of my head,

128
1 1 convert that to a monthly payment or a lump sum payment
2 II and give the Petitioner the option of exercising that,
3

giving the Respondent enough time to be able to finance

4

that, sell the farm, or get it paid.

5
6

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Your Honor, just for your record,

both parties are 55, so you're talking 10 years.

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, present value then of

8 I $120,000 would probably be around $75,000, $80,000--I
9

don't know, I'm guessing.

10
11

MR. WOODALL:
Court use?

12
13

What kind of discount rate would the

You've got to use the one in The

THE COURT:
Street

Journal

Wall

that everybody uses.

14

MR. WOODALL:

Okay.

15

MS. BLAKELOCK:

And can I ask a question?

When

16

you're saying a credit of 6,100 to him and half the

17

appraisal fee, so it's—and the difference between 192

18

and 65, which is 27,000, what I'm understanding you to

19

say is, the difference between 192,000, 165,000 is

20

27,000, plus you add into that 6,100 for the credit of

21

the money in the account, plus 300, and then that would

22 1 be the first amount of alimony he has paid to her.
23

then following that--

24

THE COURT:

I'm not following you.

25

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay.

Well, I'm just trying to

And

12 9
1

restate what you said--

2

THE COURT:

Okay.

3 I

MS. BLAKELOCK:

4

THE COURT:

--so I know if I understand it.

Conceptually, I think, if you compare

5 I 165 with 192, she's ahead "x" dollars.
6 I

MS. BLAKELOCK:

7

THE COURT:

8 I

MR. WOODALL:

9
10

All right.
That didn't include the 10,000 or

the retirement money.

We still need to talk about

that, b u t —

11

THE COURT:

12

MR. WOODALL:

13

THE COURT:

14

the retirement.

Oh, okay.
Yeah, right.
Yeah.

15 |

MS. BLAKELOCK:

16 I

MR. WOODALL:

17 I

MS. BLAKELOCK:

18

THE COURT:

19

Is 27,000.

And my intent is to give her

Okay.
Okay.
Okay.

And he doesn't g e t — h e gets credit for

the retirement that he's taken out and spent.

20

MR. WOODALL:

21

THE COURT:

Okay.
I didn't take that into account.

22

She's put that money in her retirement.

To divide that

23

equitably, I'm going to give it to her.

The federal

24

government has a formula to divide that--neither one of

25

them would be entitled to it.

I don't know.

I've
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1 II worked through that before and it seems to me that,
2 || equitably, perhaps he ought to get some credit for
3 || that, but I'm just not going to give him any.

He

4 || doesn't get any credit for the profit sharing—I'm
5 || going to give her that.
6 11

MS. BLAKELOCK:

7

THE COURT:

Okay.

She doesn't get it xtil she retires.

8

There's no way she can cash it out.

9

government doesn't even like to divide it or deal with

10
11
12

The federal

it now.
MR. WOODALL:
by no credit?

Excuse me.

What does the Court mean

We don't even consider it in the totals?

13

THE COURT:

No.

14

MS. BLAKELOCK:

15

THE COURT:

Okay.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I assume

16

that that was not — is that part of the evaluation and

17

the comparison you quoted, counsel, of 192, as opposed

18

to 165?

19

MR. WOODALL:

20

MS. BLAKELOCK:

21

MR. WOODALL:

22

MS. BLAKELOCK:

23

No.
You—that was not your—

No.
— y o u did not include that, am I

correct?

24

MR. WOODALL:

25

MS. BLAKELOCK:

No, no.
Yeah.

No.

He just a d d — I think
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1 we both agreed that that was the difference in the real
2 personal property—
3

THE COURT:

4

MS. BLAKELOCK:

5

Okay.
--which is 27,000.

If I might

rephrase my question—so, assuming that that's 27,000

6 then that's credited, there's a difference of that,
7

then you also want credited to him 6,100 that's left in

8 the account, and half of the appraisal fee, which is
9

300, correct?

10

THE COURT:

Yes.

11

MS. BLAKELOCK:

And then we—are we to take the

12

27,000, plus the 6,100, plus the 300—that's a total of

13

33,427 difference between them.

14

in half to get the amount that he's credited for his

15

alimony, which is $16,713?

16

The total difference between them being 34,000, half of

17

that would be 16,000, so he gets 16,000 credit for

18

alimony payments—future alimony payments?

19

trying to argue, I'm just trying to understand your

20

ruling, so that opposing counsel and I are both on the

21

same page here.

22

THE COURT:

23

MR. WOODALL:

24

MS. BLAKELOCK:

25

MR. WOODALL:

Do I then divide that

Is that what you're saying?

I'm not

Okay.
If we're —
I just—
I don't understand why we're giving
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her all of the 51,000, without any consideration, but
charging him half of 6,000?
MS.

BLAKELOCK:

No, I'm just — I'm not arguing,

I'm just trying to understand what the Court's saying.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MS. BLAKELOCK:

All right.

I'm just trying to get — to repeat

it back, because I'm going to write the document,
that's all.
THE COURT:

I think he gets a full credit.

MS. BLAKELOCK:
THE COURT:

He gets a full credit f o r —

MS. BLAKELOCK:
THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

— t h e 6,100 cash and one-half the

appraisal fee.
MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay, so that's 33,400.

So he

gets—just to repeat to the Court—33,400 credit for
alimony payments?
THE COURT:

Yes.

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay.

All right.

Jay, is that

clear to you, so we can work on this?
MR. WOODALL:

Yeah, just add it up.

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay.

Yeah, make sure.

27,000,

6,100 and 300.
THE COURT:
plan—

She gets the federal profit-sharing
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111

MS. BLAKELOCK:

2

THE COURT:

3

Okay.

--totally.

And I'm going to rely on

counsel to give me a number coming from each camp.

4

MS. BLAKELOCK:

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

Or if you can agree on one, fine, and

6

then that can be payable subject to agreement by the

7

parties at the Petitioner's option.

8

a —let's —I'll give the Respondent a year to get his

9

finances arranged to exercise the option to either pay

Let's say he's got

10

it monthly or in a lump sum, at the discounted rate.

11

That isn't what I said before—

12

MS. BLAKELOCK:

13

THE COURT:

14

—because I think that—but I think

I've changed my mind, and I ought t o —

15

MS. BLAKELOCK:

16

THE COURT:

17

MS. BLAKELOCK:

18

THE COURT:

19

Okay.

Okay.

— I ought to leave that as an option.
Okay.

Then--

There'll be tax—there'll be a tax

difference to both parties, but I think that probably

20 I the Petitioner has asked for that because she doesn't
21

want to deal with him.

He may have some distress in

22

getting the farm sold in that length of time, there may

23 be some other problems, so I'm going to leave it in the
24

form of an option that's available—I'll give him a

25

year to exercise it.
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1 I

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay.

To restate, for both

2 || counsel, Respondent's given—there' s an award of
3 || alimony in the amount of $1,000 a month for 10 years,
4 || assuming that they're both 55 now and it's until the
5 II age of 65.

He's given a credit on the first $33,400

6

for alimony.

He's given a year to exercise, at

7

Petitioner's option, within one year, whether it's

8

payable at one lump sum, the discounted figure, which

9

we're both going to agree on and provide to the Court,

10

or if we disagree, we'll provide those figures to the-

11

Court, or—that's a lump sum payout, perhaps at the

12

time of the sale of the property, or the payments will

13

then continue on, if there's no buyout, at $1,000 a

14

month for the next 10 years.

15

THE COURT:

16

probably today.

Is that stated properly?

Yeah, except retroactive to this—to

17

MS. BLAKELOCK:

18

THE COURT:

Okay.

Okay.

Is there anything else that you want

19 me to rule on?
20
21

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Just an understanding, Your Honor.

You said—so I can put it in the figure--you said—

22

THE COURT:

Okay, the farm, the farm.

23

talk about the farm.

24

MS. BLAKELOCK:

25

THE COURT:

Yes.

She doesn't get the lot.

I didn't
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1

MS. BLAKELOCK:

2

THE COURT:

3

MS. BLAKELOCK:

4

THE COURT:

Okay.

That would be'impractical, I think—
Okay.

--and probably affect the

5

marketability of the property and, if we believe what

6

he said, he may have a problem with the salinity

7

financing.

8
9

MS. BLAKELOCK:
more question?

Okay.

And if I just might ask one

I apologize.

10

were appropriate.

11

the award?

You said attorney's fees

Her testimony was 3,000—was that"-

You never actually said the amount.

12

THE COURT:

I said your statement—

13

MS. BLAKELOCK:

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. BLAKELOCK:

But —

--$2,500 was reasonable.
Okay.

Okay, those were my fees—

16

she also had an additional 500.

17

clarify that.

18

prepare the documents and send them over to opposing

19

counsel, and my figures on the present-day value.

20

So, it's 2,500?

THE COURT:

Okay.

I was just trying to
Okay.

Thank you.

I'll

I think, for the reasons I've

21

stated, that that—I could support the ruling, and if

22

there's any other questions you have, counsel, that

23

would help you at this time, feel free to ask.

24
25

MR. WOODALL:

Can I have some sort of a finding on

the Court's reasoning behind awarding her the full
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l|| $51,000 thrift savings, without any consideration?
2 11

THE COURT:

Yes.

My feeling is that he is trained

3

in many trades, and he's going to work.

He is going to

4

be having to work, health permitting, and not relying

5

on retirement.

6

thinking, she is to a point in her life where, after

7

35 years of marriage, she needs that retirement for her

8

security.

9

Mathematically, for the Court of Appeals' benefit, I

And maybe that's—now, based on my

That's my reasoning, subjectively.

10

would think that, all factors considered, I'm still

11

coming out with a fairly equal division, given the tax

12

benefit that he's going to get from paying the alimony,

13

either monthly or in a lump sum.

14

MR. WOODALL:

Okay.

One further question—she did

15

testify that, to the extent there are any double "E"

16

savings bonds, she'll split them.

17

of the (inaudible)?

18

THE COURT:

19

MS. BLAKELOCK:

20

MR. WOODALL:

21
22
23
24
25

Could that be part

Sure, yeah.
If any are found by either party?
We'll just get a statement from the

Treasury, whatever (inaudible).
MS. BLAKELOCK:

Okay.

But if any are held or

found, it could be either one of them lost some?
THE COURT:
ones replaced?

What do you have to do to get lost
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1

MR. WOODALL:

Well, I've never done this, but I--

2 you can notify the Treasury Department and they'11 give
3 you an accounting of what they've issued in your name
4 and what's been surrendered (inaudible).
5I

MS. BLAKELOCK:

And I just—we'll word it, if any

6 treasury or "T" bonds are held by either party, they'll
7 be split equally.
8
9

THE COURT:

She was buying some series "E" bonds,

I think.

10

MS. BLAKELOCK:

11

THE COURT:

Series "E"?

Yeah.

Whatever the bonds are, through

12 her work.
13

MS. BLAKELOCK:

Any bonds held by either party,

14 they'll—in either party's name, will be split equally?
15 Thank you.
16

THE COURT: Okay.

17

MS. BLAKELOCK:

I'll prepare the documents, Your

18 Honor.
19

THE COURT:

If I get this back from the Court of

20 Appeals because I did not make findings sufficient to
21 award her her entire profit-sharing amount, I'll have
22 time to think about it.
23

MS. BLAKELOCK:

I'm sure we'll have additional

24 hearings, if that occurs, Your Honor.
25

THE COURT:

Thank you, counsel.

Thank you.

